When managers are su¢ ciently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-e¤ective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and monitoring. This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to test whether organizations make full e¤ective use of the available preference types within their work force when drafting their organizational design. Our main …nd-ing is that they do not do so; although the importance of social preferences is recognized by those choosing the organizational mode, the signi…cant impact managers'preferences have on the behavior of workers in the organization seems to be overlooked.
Introduction
A major research theme within organizational economics is how to motivate employees to exert welldirected e¤ort. This issue is typically addressed using the principal-agent model as point of departure. In the standard version of this model the agent is assumed to solely care about his own monetary compensation and to dislike e¤ort. Similarly so, the principal just wants to maximize her own net pro…t and does not care about the agent's well-being. Given these assumptions it is derived how monetary incentives should be optimally designed in order to motivate the agent to put in su¢ cient e¤ort.
Many empirical studies have found, however, that people may have alternative motivations that go beyond material self-interest. Fairness, altruism, empathy and a preference to react in kind to kind or unkind actions of others (reciprocity) are among the various alternative motivations identi…ed. The presence of such 'social preferences'may have profound implications for the provision of e¤ort incentives. In the context of the principal-agent relationship, for instance, workers are more easily persuaded to exert
We would like to thank Enrique Fatás and LINEEX for their help and hospitality while we conducted the experiment. e¤ort when they know that their manager cares about their well-being and thus will reward higher e¤ort with a larger (non-contractible) bonus. E¤ort levels will then be higher in equilibrium, thereby increasing e¢ ciency. For this reason it may actually pay for …rms to select and hire 'empathic'managers who do not solely care about pro…t maximization; their personality type (i.e. social preferences) helps in overcoming a di¢ cult incentive problem with the workers (cf. Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) , Rotemberg (1994) , and Hermalin (2001, Section 4.2) ). In the same spirit, …rms may want to assign particular preference types within their work force to jobs where these social preferences are most e¤ective.
In this paper we leave aside the question of screening and selection of employees on the basis of their social preferences. Rather, we intend to investigate whether organizations will make optimal use of the existing social preferences within their work force, by choosing an organizational design that is particular conducive to their e¤ectiveness. Because it is notoriously di¢ cult to gather …eld data on this, we make use of laboratory experiments to test the relevant theoretical predictions at hand. Compared to the existing literature, a novel and important feature of our experiment is that we explicitly study how organizational design choices and the endogenous allocation of jobs to employees vary with the observed characteristics ('track records') of these employees.
In our experiment we simplify matters by assuming that there are two types of organizational modes, each corresponding to a di¤erent role ('leadership style') for managers. In the …rst type managers are hired to inspire and to motivate the work force. Rather than implementing a formal system that relies on explicit incentive contracts and active monitoring, managers should instill and maintain a culture that hard work will be rewarded by the organization. This implicit contract then substitutes for a more costly explicit performance measurement and evaluation system. We represent this particular organizational mode in highly reduced form with the motivation game M depicted in Figure 1a below. This game corresponds to the trust game used by Kreps (1990) to model corporate culture. It also represents a simpli…ed version of the game used by Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) to study the impact of leadership style on workers'incentives to innovate. In game M a worker …rst decides whether to put in (high) e¤ort or to shirk. In case the worker shirks, it is assumed that he does not get a reward (on top of his wage). If, however, the worker exerts e¤ort, the manager decides whether to reward him with a bonus or not. This bonus is not part of an enforceable pay-for-performance contract though. A sel…sh manager will therefore not pay the bonus and, anticipating this, the worker will not put in high e¤ort. If, however, the manager could credibly commit to pay the bonus (only) when the worker exerts e¤ort, the worker would be motivated to do so.
The second type of organizational mode relies more strongly on formal contracts and explicit monitoring. Here managers are hired to supervise and to monitor workers. Workers receive a given wage for putting in e¤ort, but are …ned or …red whenever they are caught shirking. In line with Calvo and Wellisz (1978) , the role of the manager is then to supervise, i.e. to check whether the worker does not deliver substandard work. We model this particular situation with the inspection game I depicted in Figure 1b, for high (I H ) and low (I L ) inspection costs separately. Here the manager (as a supervisor) …rst decides whether to monitor or not. If she does so, the only relevant option for the worker is to put in high e¤ort. But if the manager decides not to monitor, the worker decides whether to shirk or to exert (high) e¤ort. Payo¤s are such that sel…sh workers will shirk if not monitored. Realizing this, the manager commits to monitor in the …rst stage. 2 Assuming sel…sh preferences, the worker is predicted to exert e¤ort under organizational structure I whereas under structure M he does not. Structure I is thus more e¢ cient, and therefore likely to be preferred by the owner of the …rm (assuming that she shares in the e¢ ciency gains). Things change when employees may have social preferences. Putting a very empathic (or reciprocal) employee in the manager's position under structure M will then yield …rst best. This holds because, anticipating that he will be rewarded with a bonus by the empathic manager, the worker puts in e¤ort and does not shirk. And compared to structure I, organizational mode M saves on the costs of the monitoring technology.
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Structure M thus becomes relatively more attractive the more empathic the employees are. Another intuitive prediction is that the less costly the inspection system under structure I is, the more it takes for the owner to prefer the M structure. Lower inspection costs can e¤ectively be represented in Figure  1b by having payo¤s of 440 (instead of 360) after the manager's decision to monitor. More generally, theory predicts that the M structure which relies on empathic managers becomes less likely the more cost-e¤ective the formal performance measurement system under mode I is.
The experiment that we use to test the above predictions consists of two parts. In part one subjects make decisions in 9 di¤erent games that all have the same structure as those in Figure 1 . That is, a …rst mover (player A) …rst decides whether to 'stay-out' or to 'enter'. Only if player A enters, player B is called on to choose between left and right. Subjects both take decisions in the player A role and conditional decisions in the player B role. In that way the …rst part generates an individual 'track record' (e i ,r i ), with e i (r i ) the number of entry decisions ('right' choices) the subject made. This individual track record can be seen as a (imprecise) measure of the subject's preference type.
In part two subjects …rst learn their role, either owner of a …rm or employee. Roles are kept …xed during all 15 periods of this part. In the …rst …ve periods the organizational mode is exogenously given, by game M say. In each period …rms consisting of one owner and two employees are formed, based on a strangers design. All …rm members observe the track records of the two employees (but not of the owner). Based on this information, the owner decides which employee to put in the manager's (i.e. second mover) position. 4 After that the two employees play the corresponding game, yielding payo¤s to them as re ‡ected in Figure 1a . The owner's payo¤s equal those of the manager (and are private information). The next …ve periods consider the other organizational mode, here game I of Figure 1b . The sequence of events is the same as in periods 1 to 5. Moreover, also in game I the owner's payo¤s correspond with those of the manager, which is now the …rst mover in this game. In the …nal …ve periods the organizational mode is made endogenous and owners …rst choose between game M and game I, before they assign their workers to a particular position. Overall four sessions are conducted, that di¤er in the order in which the two organizational modes are played and in the version of the inspection game considered (I L or I H ).
Our main …ndings can be summarized as follows. The informational value of subjects'track records lies in their r i -values. In particular, in both games employees with the …rst mover role are more likely to 'enter' the higher the r i value is of the second mover with whom they are matched. So indeed, the more 'empathic' second movers are, the higher the willingness of …rst movers to enter the reciprocal relationship. Firm owners seem to overlook this mechanism, however, when assigning their employees to di¤erent roles. They naively assume that employees'decisions are mostly a¤ected by their own track record characteristics only. As a result, in the M -game they typically assign the role of manager (second mover) to the employee with the lower r i -value in his track record, i.e. to the more sel…sh employee. These assignments appear suboptimal, because pro…t would have been higher if they would assign roles the other way around. Also the choice between di¤erent organizational modes is not guided by the employees' r i values (but rather by their e i values). Nevertheless, the loss owners bear due to their suboptimal allocation of roles is rather small and they in general do correctly realize that social preferences within their work force make the M -mode relatively more attractive. Overall we therefore conclude that owners in our experiment do recognize the importance of social preferences for organizational outcomes, but do not make use of the available preferences within their work force to the fullest extent possible.
Numerous laboratory experiments have already been conducted that relate to the above discussed issues of endogenous organizational design. In a series of important papers, for instance, Ernst Fehr and various coauthors have studied the choice of optimal incentive contracts. A main common …nding is that social preferences can serve as a useful (i.e. cost-e¤ective) contract enforcement device and contracts may therefore deliberately be left incomplete. 5 In the terminology used before, in practice …rms may prefer implicit contracts over explicit incentive contracts, although under sel…sh preferences the latter would be optimal. Similarly so, others have explicitly studied the e¤ect of monitoring on behavior in more detail; see e.g. Dickinson and Villeval (2004) and Schweitzer and Ho (2005) . Compared to these previous experiments, we study (implicit and explicit) contracts and monitoring in highly reduced form (cf. Figure 1) . The main contribution of our experiment is that we explicitly relate these (reduced form) organizational choices to the observed characteristics ('track records') of the employees that are to be a¤ected by these instruments. Apart from that, another new feature is that we explore the endogenous allocation of roles within organizations. This paper proceeds as follows. Assuming that employees may care about the well-being of others, we derive in the next section the formal predictions and hypotheses that are put to the test. Section 3 presents the details of our experimental design whereas Section 4 reports the results. The …nal section summarizes and concludes.
Our experiment is based on the M -game and the I-game as depicted in Figure 1 . 6 Both games have the same general decision structure, which is re ‡ected in Figure 2 [ Insert Figure 2 about here ]
Social preferences may lead players away from the ine¢ cient (Out,Left) outcome. Various alternative motivations have been identi…ed in the literature -like fairness, altruism, empathy and reciprocityand a number of theoretical models have been developed to capture these types of social preferences in a formal way. Prominent examples include Fehr and Schmidt (1999) ´s model of inequality-aversion, Charness and Rabin (2002) ´s model of quasi-maximin preferences, and Rabin (1993) ´s model of intentionbased reciprocity (see also Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) ). Although these models can lead to quite di¤erent predictions in particular situations, a common theme they share is that social preferences may be e¢ ciency enhancing. It is this common aspect that we want to emphasize here.
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To illustrate the impact alternative motivations may have, we capture social preferences in a very simple and stylized way. Let i and j denote player i's and j's monetary payo¤s. Following Charness and Rabin (2002) , we assume that player i's preferences take the following form (with i 6 = j and i; j 2 fA; Bg):
In this speci…cation, parameter i gives the weight player i attaches to the other player's payo¤s when she herself is ahead. Parameter i re ‡ects the corresponding weight when she is behind. Without any restrictions on i and i utility function (1) can capture a range of di¤erent motivations. Charness and Rabin (2002) use the results of a variety of simple games with a similar decision structure as in Figure 2 , to estimate the values of i and i . They …nd that on average players do not care about other players'payo¤s when they are behind, but put a positive weight on the well-being of others when they are ahead. In line with their estimates we therefore assume that 0 < i < 1 and that i 0. These assumptions incorporate the inequality-aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , which corresponds to i < 0 < i < 1 and j i j i . They are also in line with Hermalin (2001, Section 4.2) , who assumes that a player su¤ers from 'remorse'only if he is ahead.
Assuming preferences as in (1) Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) , we say that a player is more empathic the higher his i is.
To capture the role of the owner of the …rm, next assume there is a third player C who decides on role assignment. In particular, player C has two employees at her disposal, numbered such that 1 2 . Her task is to decide which employee gets role A and who gets role B. In contrast to her two employees, for ease of exposition player C is assumed to be sel…sh. Her monetary payo¤s equal some weighted combination A A + (1 A ) B of the monetary payo¤s of A and B; 9 e¤ectively, player C cares about e¢ ciency. Then, knowing that in equilibrium the outcome either equals Out or (Enter, Right), player C prefers to assign role B to the more empathic employee 2 . This follows because this maximizes the probability that the more e¢ cient outcome (Enter,Right) is obtained.
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Apart from role assignment, player C may possibly also choose between game M and game I. These two games share the same decision structure of Figure 2 , but payo¤s are di¤erent. In particular, b I > b M and c I < c M (cf. Figure 1) . 11 Moreover, in game M player C gets the same as player B (so A = 0) whereas in game I her monetary payo¤s equal those of player A ( A = 1). The idea here is that the owner C gets the same as the manager, which corresponds to player B in the M -game and player A in the I-game. Given this payo¤ structure, player C will choose game M only when outcome (Enter,Right) is expected in that game. This yields her c M whereas game I gives her at most c I . If, however, outcome Out would result in game M , player C prefers to choose game I. The latter yields her at least b I ; which exceeds b M . The predicted outcome within each game depends on how the player B's level of empathy B compares to the critical value for that game, viz. either M or I . 12 If 2 > M player C is best o¤ by choosing game M (and putting employee 2 in position B). Otherwise, C is better o¤ in the I-game. Hence we obtain that C is more likely to choose game M the more empathic her employees are. Finally, we analyze the role of inspection costs in the I-game. Higher inspection costs correspond to lower values for b I . If player C would be perfectly informed on her employees'empathy parameters i , variations in b I would not a¤ect the predicted outcomes (as long as b I > b M ). However, it seems reasonable to assume that parameter i is employee i's private information. The owner may have a good idea about what the value of i is, but is not completely sure about its exact value. In particular, the owner believes that i is drawn from a particular probability distribution. If she chooses the I-game 8 Here we assume that in the knife-edge case where player B is indi¤erent ( B = ), he chooses Right for sure. 9 In the experiment player C's payo¤s are private information to her, so A and B cannot be guided by empathic feelings towards player C. This justi…es that (1) does not include C .
1 0 Note that e¤ectively role assignment makes a di¤erence only when 1 < < 2 . Then the outcome is (Enter, Right) when employee 2 is put in the B-role and Out when employee 1 is put in the B-role. Because c > b player C prefers the former assignment. Moreover, because in each of these two outcomes all players earn the same, exactly the same predictions follow when player C is also guided by social preferences similar to those in (1) :
1 1 As explained in the Appendix, the …rst inequality b I > b M re ‡ects the idea that the value of the worker's e¤ort exceeds the overall costs of a formal monitoring system. Restriction c I < c M derives from the fact that installing a monitoring technology brings about (…xed) investment costs, even when it is not actively used in the end.
1 2 For the parameters chosen in our experiment (cf. . then, her expected payo¤s equal a weighted average of b I and c I : If she opts for the M -game instead, she gets a weighted average of b M and c M : Other things equal, the expected payo¤s of choosing the I-game are lower the lower b I is. Player C is thus more likely to choose M over I H than over I L (cf. Figure 1 ). Taken together, we obtain the following …ve predictions that are put to the test:
1. The more empathic player B is (i.e. the higher B is), the more likely it is that he chooses Right;
2. The more empathic player B is (i.e. the higher B is), the more likely it is that player A enters;
3. Players C will assign the role of player B to the more empathic employee within her work force (i.e. to the one with the higher i -value);
4. The more empathic the work force is (i.e. the higher 2 ), the more likely it is that player C prefers the M -game over the I-game;
5. Ceteris paribus, player C is more likely to choose M over I H than over I L .
These formal predictions correspond to the intuitive predictions discussed in the Introduction. To see this, recall that in game M the worker moves …rst whereas the manager moves second. The …rst prediction then reads: the more empathic the manager is, the more likely it becomes that he will reward high e¤ort with a bonus. As a result, the worker has a stronger incentive to put in high e¤ort (cf. the second prediction). In contrast, in game I the manager moves …rst and the worker moves second. Then the more empathic the worker is, the more likely it is that he chooses high e¤ort. Anticipating this, the manager is more likely to abstain from costly monitoring.
Turning to owner behavior, the third prediction implies that in the inspection mode, the more sel…sh employees within the …rm are the managers. In contrast, in the motivation mode the most empathic types are assigned the role of manager. Managers in the inspection mode will therefore on average be more sel…sh than managers in the motivation mode. When owners can choose between organizational modes, we expect that they will opt for the motivation game M only when they have at least one rather empathic type among their employees. This employee will then be given the role of manager. Otherwise the inspection game will be chosen and the least empathic type will be given the managerial position. Finally, the more costly the formal monitoring system is (structure I H versus I L ), the more likely it is that structure M is chosen.
Like in reality, in the experiment employees do not observe the level of empathy of their colleagues precisely, and neither do so owners C. Based on an observable track record of past choices, however, an estimate r i of a player's empathy level i can be obtained. The formal hypotheses we want to test then correspond to predictions 1 through 5 above, where i is replaced by its estimate r i . Exactly how individual track records are generated in the experiment is explained in the next section.
Experimental design
Our experiment is based on a 2 by 3 treatments design. In each session we kept the two types of games (game M and game I) …xed. Between sessions we varied the particular version of the inspection game, having either the one representing low inspection costs (I L ) or the other one with high inspection costs 
We ran four sessions in total, which di¤ered according to (the order of) the treatments considered. Table 1 provides an overview. All sessions were run in May 2007 at the LINEEX laboratory of the University of Valencia. Overall 180 subjects participated, with 45 subjects per session. The subject pool consisted of undergraduate students at the University of Valencia. The vast majority of them (88%) were students in Economics or Business, 57% were male. They earned on average 24:5 euros in somewhat less than 2 hours, including a show up fee of 7 euros. Each sessions consisted of two parts. At the beginning of the experiment subjects were informed about this. They were also informed that possibly some of the choices they made in part 1 would become observable to some other participants in part 2. 13 In particular, the instructions for part one explained that:
"...It may happen that in part two some other participants get some information about the decisions you made in part one. It may also happen though that none of your part one decisions will ever become known to any other participant..." 
The latter di¤ers between the M -game and the two I-games, see the …nal column in Table 2 . Second, the M and I games also di¤er in the amount player A forgoes by choosing to enter.
The remaining six games have been chosen using games I through III as starting point. Game IV combines the payo¤s of the 'stay-out'option of the M -game with the sacri…ce-reward values of the two I-games. Games V and VI do so vice versa. The …nal three games combine the stay-out payo¤s of games I through III with equal sacri…ce-reward values such that an of one half results. We used the …rst part to generate a 'track record'for each individual. Such a track record consisted of a two-tuple (e i ; r i ), with e i ; r i 2 f0; 1; :::; 9g the number of enter choices subject i made as player A and the number of 'right'choices s/he made as player B, respectively. Note that this track record does not indicate to which of the nine games the e i enter choices and the r i 'right' choices belong. In that sense the track record only provides aggregate (or general) information.
At the start of the second part subjects …rst learned their roles, being either an owner ("person C") or an employee ("group member"). Subjects kept the same role throughout the entire second part. Roles were assigned as follows. In each session we ranked the 45 subjects on the basis of the number of 'right' choices r i in their track record. Subjects with rank 16 to 30 were assigned the role of owner and the remainder the role of employee. This procedure -unknown to the subjects -secured that we had enough variation in empathy types among employees.
Once roles were assigned, subjects played 15 periods. At the beginning of each period, …rms (called "groups" in the experiment) consisting of one owner and two employees were exogenously formed. We used a stranger design, in which each subject met each other subject exactly once. Subjects were thus never confronted with the same …rm member again and they were explicitly informed about that.
The 15 periods were divided into three blocks of …ve. In the …rst …ve periods, either the I L (I H ) game or the M game was played in isolation (see Table 1 above). In each of these periods the owner …rst decided, on the basis of the observed track records, which role to assign to each of her two employees. The owner thus observed (e 1 ; r 1 ) and (e 2 ; r 2 ) of her two assigned employees, and so did the two employees of each other.
17 One of the employees should be assigned the role of player A, the other one should be given the role of player B. After employees were assigned their roles, they played the game that applied, making decisions for the role assigned. This determined their period payo¤s, as given in the respective extensive form games. The owner received a period payo¤ equal to those of player A in the I-game and equal to those of player B in the M -game. To easily remind owners about this fact, we labelled the I-game as game "Azul" and the M -game as game "Blanco" (and we printed these games against the corresponding background color). The complete setup of the game was common knowledge, except for the payo¤s of the owner, which were known to players C only. We did so to ensure that employees' decisions were not guided by empathic feelings towards player C. In periods 6 to 10 the other game was played (cf. Table 1 ). Again, in each period …rms were exogenously formed and the owner …rst decided on role assignment. After that, the two employees made their respective choices and period payo¤s were obtained. In the …nal …ve periods 11 to 15, the owner …rst chose which game to play. Once a game had been chosen, the order of decisions was as before.
Except for the decisions made within their own …rm in a given period, subjects did not get information on how the other subjects behaved in part 2. Although they may have recorded the decisions made by previous …rm members in earlier periods, this information is of limited value because they would never meet with the same other subject again. The observable track records they obtained from part 1 were thus the main clue they could use to predict the behavior of other subjects within their …rm. The track record of owners was never made public. Therefore, for one third of the subjects the decisions made in part one remained private information throughout the experiment.
Payo¤s were determined in the following way. From the …rst part one game was selected at random. For this particular game subjects were then randomly coupled in pairs and were randomly assigned roles. 18 The individual payo¤s that resulted from these pairings gave the earnings for the …rst part. To this amount we added the overall payo¤s from the second part. The conversion rate was such that 500 points in the experiment corresponded with 1 euro in money. Apart from that, subjects received a show up fee of 7 euros. The experiment was computerized using the z-tree programming package (cf. Fischbacher (2007) ). Subjects started with written instructions for the …rst part, which were also read aloud by the experimenter. At the end of the …rst part subjects received new instructions for the second part. Before the second part started, subjects played one practice period. After …nishing the second part subjects …lled in a short questionnaire. Having completed this, the experimental points earned were exchanged for money and subjects were paid individually and discreetly.
Results
In this section we …rst describe the distribution of individual 'track records'as generated by the choices subjects made in part one. Next we look at how players A and B behave in the three games M , I H and I L at hand. We explicitly test our …rst two hypotheses that: (i) B's are more likely to reward A's entry when they have a higher r-value in their own track record and (ii) A's in turn are more likely to enter the higher this r B -value is. The …nal subsection looks at the organizational design choices made by players C. It is tested whether they assign the B-role to the employee with the higher r-value in his track record and whether they are more likely to choose the M -game when the latter r-value is higher. 
Remark: Numbers on the diagonal where ei = ri appear in bold.
Individual track records
In part one each subject makes nine entry decisions as player A and nine (conditional) choices between Left and Right as player B. From these 18 choices, an individual track record (e i ; r i ) results. Table 3 gives the overall distribution observed for the 180 subjects in our experiment. On average subjects choose to enter 3:76 times as player A and as player B they choose Right on average 2:83 times. As the frequency distribution makes clear though, there is quite some heterogeneity. Most observations are scattered around the diagonal, suggesting that the number of Enter and Right choices are correlated. Indeed, for our full sample of 180 subjects the Spearman rank correlation between e and r choices equals 0:48 and is highly signi…cant (p = 0:000).
19 Moreover, many entries in Table 3 are above the diagonal. This indicates that subjects typically choose Enter somewhat more often as player A than they choose Right as player B, which is corroborated by formal signrank tests.
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There are some minor di¤erences in the observed track records across sessions. Comparing the number of r-choices by means of a Kruskal-Wallis test, we do not …nd a signi…cant di¤erence (at the 5% level) between the four sessions (p = 0:0723). For the number of enter choices there are some di¤erences though (p = 0:0131). Both ranksum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reveal that subjects in session 3 have a lower e-value than those in sessions 1 and 4. In the former the average equals 2:87, in the latter two 4:13 and 3:96, respectively. But even in session 3 the average e-value (2:87) exceeds the average r-value (2:44). The main observation of a substantial correlation between e and r-choices with (slightly) higher e-choices thus applies to all sessions.
As explained in the previous section, after part one we ordered the subjects on the basis of their number of r-choices. The middle third given by ranks 16 to 30 were assigned the role of player C. In sessions 1 and 4 these were subjects with r i = 2 to r i = 4, whereas in sessions 2 and 3 these where subjects with r i = 1 to r i = 3 and with r i = 1 to r i = 4; respectively. Recall that in every period players C were assigned one employee from the low-r group and another one from the high-r group. 
Employees'choices
We next look at the decisions players A and B make in part 2 of the experiment. Recall that each of the three games M , I H and I L has the same decision structure as in Figure 2 . Tables 4 through 6 provide an overview of the outcomes observed.
In periods 1 to 10 the game was exogenously given whereas in the last …ve periods it was endogenously chosen by player C. The predominant outcome in game I L is that player A chooses Out. In the very few instances that A chooses to enter, player B is about equally likely to choose either Left or Right. The latter also applies for game I H , but there player A is somewhat more likely to enter. Finally, in the motivation game it is (much) more likely that player A enters than in the two inspection games. But there player B also appears more likely to choose Left over Right.
The …rst hypothesis we want to test is whether a subject with a higher r-value in his/her track record is more likely to choose Right if assigned the role of player B. For the three games together we have overall 237 cases in which player A chooses to enter and thus B gets to make a choice. We use these observations to estimate a random e¤ects probit model of the probability that B chooses Right.
The four speci…cations reported in Table 7 all include player B's r-value from his track record. Apart from that, in the …rst column two 0=1-dummies for respectively the I H -game and the M -game are incorporated (so I L serves as baseline), together with a time trend 'period'. The second column adds the remaining variables of B's and A's track record. These two speci…cations do not distinguish between whether the game played is the …rst or the second exogenous game played in a row, or whether it is endogenously chosen by player C. Speci…cations (3) and (4) add additional zero-one dummies to identify potential order and treatment e¤ects in this regard.
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In line with our …rst hypothesis, player B's own r-value is always signi…cant. Also the r-value of player A appears (marginally) signi…cant. The latter suggests that player B's reaction to A's entry choice partially depends on how A would have behaved were he in B's position. The e-values in the track records of A and B do not have a signi…cant impact. Although Tables 4 through 6 above suggest that B is less likely to choose Right in the motivation game, the probit estimates for the M -game dummy are insigni…cant (but do have the expected negative sign). The time trend 'period'is signi…cantly negative, indicating that the propensity to choose Right decreases over time. We summarize our main …nding from Table 7 in Result 1.
Result 1. B's with a higher r-value in their track record are more likely to choose Right in all three games.
We next turn to A's choice between Enter and Out. This choice is observed for every interaction in part 2, so we have 900 observations in this case. Table 8 gives the random e¤ects probit estimates of the probability to enter.
In all speci…cations, the r-value in B's track record (…rst row) is a highly signi…cant determinant of A's decision to enter. The higher r B is, the larger A's entry propensity. Entry is also signi…cant more likely in the I H and the M -game as compared to the I L -game. Apart from that, also player A's own r-value increases his probability of choosing enter. The e-values in the employees'track records do not play a signi…cant role though. In particular, player A's own e-value does not provide much information about his probability of entry. 22 Overall, these results are in line with our second hypothesis.
Result 2. The higher r B is, the more likely it is that player A enters.
Results 1 and 2 are consistent. The higher r B is, the more likely it is that player B chooses Right. This in turn makes it more attractive for A to enter, in line with what we observe. Player B's track record thus contains valuable information about how he is going to behave, which is actually used by A to guide his entry decision. In the next subsection we investigate whether this mechanism is recognized as such by player C when deciding on organizational design. Another important observation that follows from Tables 7 and 8 is that, given the employees' rvalues, their e-values do not provide useful additional information about their likely future behavior. Put di¤erently, the informational value of the track records lies in the r-values; the e-values are informative only to the extent that they are correlated with the r-values.
Allocation of roles and organizational design
In part two player C makes two types of choices. First, in every period she has to decide on role assignment. Observing the track records (e i ; r i ) and (e j ; r j ) of her two employees, player C decides who 2 1 The dummy variable 'second' equals one if period is in between 6 and 10, and zero otherwise. Variable 'endo' equals one i¤ period exceeds 10. The four interaction terms multiply the game dummies with second and endo, respectively.
2 2 The insigni…cance of e i -own in speci…cations (2) and (4) of Table 8 is only partly due to the fairly substantial correlation between e i -own and r i -own (potentially leading to problems of multi-collinearity). If we leave r i -own out of speci…cation (2), we obtain a coe¢ cient estimate of 0:056 for e i -own with a p-value of 0:084. If we leave r i -own out of speci…cation (4), the coe¢ cient for e i -own remains insigni…cant (p = 0:460). (100%) gets the role of player A and who becomes player B. Moreover, in periods 11 to 15 player C also chooses, before role assignment, the game that is going to be played. Tables 9 through 11 provide an overview of the assignment decisions in the three di¤erent games. These tables reveal whether the employee who obtained role B is the one with the higher r-value in his track record (r A < r B ) or whether this is the other way around (r A > r B ), and similarly so for the e-values. Owing to our role assignment procedure based on the ranking of r i -values, the two employees within a group never had the same r-value. This does not apply to the e i -values though, explaining the additional row where e A = e B in these tables. From the observed assignment patterns it immediately follows that our third hypothesis is rejected; players C do not always assign the role of player B to the employee with the higher r-value in his track record. In the two inspection games it does hold that C is more likely to assign role B to the employee with the higher r-value. In the motivation game this is actually the other way around; there player C is more likely to assign role A to the higher r-value within her work force. 23 Given the fairly high correlation between subjects' r and e-values, the order of e-values among the two employees typically corresponds with the order of r-values. Assignment on the basis of relative e-values thus often (but not always) coincides with allocation on the basis of relative r-values.
Role assignment
2 3 To account for the multiple assignment decisions per player C, we formally test this as follows. For each individual player C we compute the average values of r B and r A for each game separately. We then compare these individual means r B and r A by means of signrank tests. For the two I-games r B is signi…cantly larger than r A (p = 0:0472 in I L and p = 0:0045 in I H ), for the M -game r B is signi…cantly lower than r A (p = 0:0000). Comparing assignment patterns of r-values across games, we …nd that these do not di¤er between the two inspection games. But they are signi…cantly di¤erent for the motivation game; the average value of r B (per individual player C) is lower in the motivation game as compared to the average value of r B (per individual player C) in the inspection games.
24 As a result of this, managers in the M -game (players B) have on average an r i -value that does not di¤er signi…cantly from managers in the I-game (players A). 25 This …nding contrasts with the theoretical prediction that managers in the M -game will be more empathic than managers in the I-game.
Result 3. Players C quite often do not assign the role of player B to the employee with the higher rvalue. In the inspection games C is more likely to assign role B to the high-r employee, in the motivation game she is more likely to give role B to the low-r employee.
Result 3 is opposite to what we expected. Especially in the M -game it is important for player C to stimulate entry, because the payo¤ after Out is low, and assigning the high-r type to role B appears an e¤ective instrument to do so (cf. Results 1 and 2). Yet the majority of player C's does not do this. A potential explanation why C's in game M tend to assign role B to the low-r employee is that they naively assume that A's and B's decisions are a¤ected only by their own e A and r B values, respectively. In particular, C's may overlook that A's entry decision is mainly guided by the value of r B (cf. Result 2). If C's indeed have such naive expectations, they would prefer to assign the high-e employee to role A and the low-r employee to role B. This follows because C gets the same as player B in game M and thus is necessarily better o¤ when A enters instead of staying out (and she is best o¤ when B chooses Left in reaction). This could explain the direction in the assignment patterns we observe; high (e i ; r i ) types typically get role A whereas low (e i ; r i ) types usually get role B. Moreover, one would expect naive C's to focus predominantly on relative e-values in order to stimulate entry, because stimulating Left in reaction to entry is useful only when entry can be induced.
For the two inspection games matters are less clear under naive expectations. Surely, C then prefers to give role B to the high-r employee. This maximizes the probability that B chooses Right after A enters. But given that C gets the same as A in these games, entry is now risky for player C; she may end up with the lowest payo¤ when B chooses Left upon A's entry. It is therefore a priori unclear whether a naive C wants to increase the probability of entry by assigning the high-e employee to role A, or whether she prefers to avoid the worst outcome (Enter, Left) in this game by giving the low-e employee role A. Under naive expectations one therefore expects that allocation decisions may be driven by both the relative r-values and the relative e-values of the two employees.
Given the substantial correlation between e i and r i , it is di¢ cult to identify precisely the separate e¤ects of e i and r i on the probability of obtaining role B. But the random e¤ects probit estimates in Table 12 provide suggestive evidence. These estimates are calculated as follows. For each allocation decision of player C we focus on the employee with the lower subject id in player C's current group of employees. Because subject id's are allocated at random, this corresponds to a random selection of one of the two employees player C has in a particular period. For these employees we estimate the probability Remark: Standard errors in parentheses. = = indicates signi…cance at the 1=5=10% level. 'exo given' refers to periods 1 to 10 where the game at hand is exogenously given, 'endo chosen' refers to periods 11 to 15 where the game is chosen by player C as well.
that they are assigned role B, where the random e¤ects procedure takes account of the fact that we have multiple allocation decisions per player C within our sample. We pool the data from the two inspection games, because as already discussed above allocation patterns were the same in I L and I H . However, we report separate estimates for the cases where the game at hand is exogenously …xed and where it is endogenously chosen. We do so because allocation patterns may be a¤ected by the determinants that drive the choice of organizational design.
Two explanatory variables are included: (i) the di¤erence in r-values between the lower id employee and the other employee and (ii) the di¤erence in e-values between them. For the two inspection games …ndings depend on whether the game is exogenously given or whether it is endogenously chosen. In the former case only the di¤erence in r-values appears signi…cant; this suggests that players C particularly focus on assigning the higher r-value to role B. However, when the inspection game is endogenously chosen, only the di¤erence in e-values is signi…cant. Then players C prefer to assign the higher e-value to role B and thus the lower e-value to role A. A plausible explanation is that by doing so, players C hope to reduce entry. The results for the motivation game are largely independent of whether this game is exogenously given or endogenously chosen. In this game C's are mostly concerned with getting the low-e value in role B, that is, assigning the high-e value to role A.
These patterns makes sense when C's have naive expectations as described earlier. In the two inspection games C's will be mostly concerned with avoiding the very unattractive outcome (Enter,Left), and they think they can do so either by having the higher r-value in role B and/or the lower e-value in role A. The shift in focus towards the latter when the I-game is endogenously chosen is in line with the relative e-values being decisive in actual game choice (see below). 26 In the motivation game players C particularly would like to stimulate entry. Naive C's think that this is best accomplished by assigning the higher e-value to role A.
The observation that C's may have naive expectations is in line with earlier experimental …ndings that people tend to analyze extensive form games in a forward rather than in a backward manner. Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002) consider a three-round alternating o¤er bargaining game in which the pie up for division shrinks over time. The actual pie sizes in each of the three rounds were hidden in boxes on the computer screen, which could be opened by moving the cursor into the box. The computer software recorded which box was opened, for how long, the order in which the boxes were opened etc.. Strikingly, most subjects focused on the …rst round box and did not su¢ ciently look ahead. In a non-negligible fraction of observations, subjects did not even open the round two and round three boxes. 27 In our setting naive C's also do not backward induct su¢ ciently. They simply look forward at the …rst (entry) decision taken by player A, overlooking the fact that this decision is a¤ected by player A's expectation about B's likely choice (for which r B provides relevant information).
The above discussion suggests that, due to their naive expectations, players C make suboptimal allocation decisions, especially in the motivation game. Result 2 namely indicates that entry is best stimulated by assigning the higher r-value to role B.
28 On the other hand, such an allocation also stimulates B to choose Right after Enter, and (conditional on entry) C would be better o¤ if B chooses Left instead. To assess the overall e¤ect we therefore investigate how player C's pro…ts vary with her allocation decision. Table 13 presents random e¤ects regression estimates of player C's pro…t for each of the three games separately. As explanatory variables we include the track record characteristics of C's two employees, together with two treatment dummies and a time trend. First focussing on the M -game, we observe that the e-values of player A and B do not signi…cantly a¤ect player C's pro…ts. The r-values, on the other hand, signi…cantly increase pro…ts. It also holds that the coe¢ cient of r B is signi…cantly larger than the one of r A (p = 0:0537). Player C would thus make more pro…t if she would give the employee with the higher r-value role B. Because she typically does not do so (cf. Result 3), allocation decisions in the motivation game are indeed suboptimal.
In regard to the two inspection games no signi…cant e¤ects are found for the employees'track record variables. 29 An explanation for this is that a higher r B -value not only makes outcome (Enter, Right) more likely, but also the worst possible outcome (Enter, Left). 30 The regression results suggest that the payo¤ consequences of these two opposing e¤ects cancel out. Pro…t levels are thus largely insensitive to assignment and therefore role allocation cannot be labelled suboptimal for the inspection games.
Result 4. In the motivation game Players C make more pro…t when they assign the high-r employee to role B. In the inspection games pro…t levels are largely insensitive to the assignment of the employees. 
Game choice
We …nally look at the game choice player C makes in the …nal …ve periods of part 2. From Table 14 it can be observed that when player C chooses between I L and M , she is about equally likely to choose either game. But when the choice is between I H and M , she chooses the motivation game in around 73% of the cases. In line with theoretical predictions, therefore, C is more likely to choose M over I H than M over I L .
To explore game choice in more detail, Table 15 reports random e¤ects probit estimates of the probability that game M is chosen. The …rst two columns pool the choices made between I L and M and between I H and M . Here r High (r Low ) refers to the r-value of the employee with the higher (lower) r in his track record. Variables e High and e Low are de…ned similarly. Apart from the track record characteristics of player C's two employees, the …rst speci…cation also includes a dummy equal to one i¤ I H is the alternative, a time trend, and a variable M I measuring the di¤erence in average realized pro…ts player C obtained from the two games in the …rst ten periods (where these games were exogenously given). Intuitively, one would expect that C is more likely to choose game M when this game yielded her higher pro…ts than game I did in the past. In the second speci…cation we include player C's own track record as well. The …nal two columns consider the two subsamples M versus I L and M versus I H in isolation.
In all four speci…cations variable r High is far from signi…cant. The estimates thus do not lend support to the hypothesis that the higher the value of r High within player C's work force is, the more likely it is that the M -game is chosen. The single variable from the employees' track records that appears a signi…cant determinant (in 3 out of 4 speci…cations) is e High . The higher e High is, the more likely it becomes that player C chooses M: The only two other variables that attain signi…cance are the pro…t di¤erence M I and the M versus I H dummy. Not surprisingly, the better (relative) experience player C has with game M in the past, the more likely she is to choose this game over the inspection game. And similar so the worse the alternative is, i.e. I H instead of I L .
Result 5. (i) Players C's choice between the motivation game and the inspection game is not guided by the r i -values in her employees'track records. From these records only the highest e-value e High matters; the higher e High , the more likely it is that C chooses game M . (ii) player C is more likely to choose game M over game I H than over game I L :
Even though role assignment is suboptimal in the M -game, subjects may still make close to optimal choices between the I-game and the M -game. To explore this issue we use the random e¤ects regressions of player C's pro…ts reported in Table 13 to predict the pro…ts player C in reality may obtain from either Remark: Standard errors in parentheses. = = indicates signi…cance at the 1=5=10% level. Rho gives the proportion of overall variance contributed by the panel-level component; its signi…cance is based on a likelihood ratio test that rho=0. LR-chi2 reports the test statistic from testing that all coe¢ cients (except the constant) are zero. one of these two games. Table 16 provides an overview of the average predicted pro…ts, together with the average actual pro…ts. Apart from that, the table also lists the average estimated pro…t player C could have obtained under optimal role assignment in the M -game (see the row labelled M Opt ). Some important observations can be made from Table 16 . First, compared to the predictions under sel…sh preferences, the M -mode does much better than predicted (predicted pro…ts equal 280), whereas the two I-games do slightly worse (predicted pro…ts of 440 and 360, respectively). This …nding is well in line with the many earlier experimental studies showing that social preferences may greatly enhance e¢ ciency especially under informal implicit contracts (see the Introduction). Here the direct consequence is that the pro…ts player C can attain under the I H -game are in practice signi…cantly and substantially lower than under the M -game. Subjects by and large realize this, because in 73% of the cases players C opt for the M -game when the alternative is the I H -game. Players C thus broadly recognize that the social preferences within their work force make the M -game relatively more attractive. Second, although role assignment under the M -game is suboptimal and signi…cantly reduces pro…ts, the average loss in pro…ts is relatively small in absolute magnitude (around 10 25 points).
Overall the following general picture emerges. For players C the motivation game is attractive only if entry can be induced in this game. They naively think that this can be best accomplished by allocating role A to the employee with the highest e i -value. Player Cs then choose game M when this e High -value is relatively high. In case e High is low Cs are more likely to choose the inspection game and will assign this player the role of B. A rationale for the latter assignment is that player C hopes to avoid the very bad outcome (Enter,Left) in this way. Allocation decisions are naive in the sense that Cs seem to overlook the signi…cant impact of B's track record (in particular r B ) on A's entry choices, especially in game M where this relationship is of vital importance. They therefore mainly look at the employee's own track record to form expectations about how he would behave in role A. This leads to suboptimal allocation choices in game M . In turn, the choice between games is distorted as well. Nevertheless, the loss in pro…ts due to a distorted allocation of employees is rather small under the M -game and players Cs in general do correctly realize that social preferences make mode M more attractive than mode I H . They thus seem to recognize the general impact of social preferences, but do not make full e¤ective use of it.
Conclusion
Organizations di¤er widely in the practices they use to motivate their employees. Some organizations heavily rely on formal contracts with explicit incentives and active monitoring. Here an important task of managers is to supervise and inspect workers in order to detect potential shirking. Other organizational modes are predominantly based on implicit informal agreements that hard work will be rewarded. In this case the main task of managers is to inspire and to motivate the work force. In these organizations employment contracts are largely incomplete and a substitute mechanism is needed to convince workers that the organization is indeed committed to reward high e¤ort. Apart from repeated interaction and reputation (cf. Kreps (1990) ), appointing managers that empathize with their employees may provide such a commitment (cf. Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) ). This motivational mode where managers with social preferences are hired saves on the costs of using a formal performance measurement system.
In this paper we test several predictions concerning organizational design by means of a laboratory experiment. Theory predicts that the motivation-mode is viable only if managers are su¢ ciently empathic whereas for the inspection-mode this is not the case. The more empathic employees within the work force should therefore be given the managerial positions in the M -mode (but not in the I-mode). And the more empathic these managers are, the more attractive organizational mode M becomes relative to the inspection mode.
Our main …ndings are that owners by and large overlook the signi…cant impact of a manager's preference type on worker behavior in the M -mode. They naively assume that the worker's e¤ort decision is mainly guided by the preference type of the worker himself. They therefore allocate roles suboptimally in the M -mode, with workers rather than managers being the more empathic types. As a result of this, choices between organizational modes di¤er from theoretical predictions as well. Nevertheless, owners do correctly realize that the (potential) existence of social preferences within their work force makes the motivation mode relatively more attractive. Taken together, we conclude that owners in our experiment do recognize that social preferences matter, but do not make full e¤ective use of the available preference types within their work force when drafting their organizational design.
Appendix: basic model of endogenous organizational design
In the experiment subjects are confronted with the simple games depicted in Figure 1 . To motivate the particular parameter values we have chosen, we consider in this Appendix a bare bone (reduced form) model of endogenous organizational design. Because the main purpose here is to justify our parameter choices, in this model we abstract away from the owner's assignment decision.
A …rm consists of three agents: the owner who owns the …rm, a manager hired to run the …rm on her behalf and a worker doing the productive work. The worker can either put in low e¤ort ('shirk') or high e¤ort ('work'). In the former case the value of his productivity equals v 0 whereas in the latter case it is v 1 (here all parameters are positive). The worker's disutility of putting in high (instead of low) e¤ort equals g. Therefore, a sel…sh worker will shirk if no additional measures are taken.
One way to motivate the worker to put in high e¤ort is to set up a performance monitoring system. We assume that such a system, when fully implemented, always induces the worker to work. It brings about three types of costs though. First, there are the costs k of setting up and installing the monitoring technology. Investments in technological equipment and organizational procedures are needed to allow accurate measurement of the worker's productivity. 31 Second, h denotes the …rm's inspection costs. Even with the monitoring technology in place, scarce resources like the manager's time need to be devoted to monitor the worker. Third, the worker dislikes being monitored because it gives him the feeling of being controlled, leading to a disutility of d. We assume that the overall costs of the formal monitoring system fall short of the net bene…ts of getting the worker to work:
Therefore, in the absence of alternative incentive instruments, the …rm would bene…t from using a formal monitoring system. As in in the main text we will refer to this as the 'inspection mode', or I-mode in short. Here the main task of the manager is to check whether the worker does not deliver substandard work. In regard to compensation we assume that the worker receives a …xed wage w I . The manager is paid on the basis of performance pay, getting a share f I 2 (0; 1) of the …rm's net pro…ts (while the owner gets the remainder). An alternative way to motivate the worker is to promise him a bonus whenever he puts in high e¤ort. Because e¤ort itself is non-contractable, this bonus payment cannot be made part of a formal contract though. The incentive system thus relies on an implicit contract that the promise will be kept. This type of organizational design is labelled as the motivation mode, or M -mode in short. Here the main task of the manager is to inspire and to motivate, by developing and maintaining a culture that high e¤ort is indeed rewarded by the …rm. In the M -mode the worker receives a wage w M and is promised a bonus b M on top of that if he exerts high e¤ort. The manager gets a fraction f M 2 (0; 1) of …rm pro…ts. This performance pay gives a sel…sh manager an incentive to renege on the promised bonus payment.
Overall the game model of Figure A1 results. First the owner chooses the organizational mode. If the M -mode is chosen, the worker moves next by deciding whether to shirk or the work. Only if the worker works, the manager decides whether to pay the promised bonus or not. (Here the implicit assumption is that the manager never wants to reward shirking with a bonus.) In the I-mode the manager moves before the worker does. The manager either commits to monitor or not to do so. In the former case the worker is assumed to work, because the disutility of working falls short of the costs of getting caught shirking. If the manager does not monitor, the worker chooses between shirking or working. The players' payo¤s then follow from the assumptions made above.
[ Insert Figure A1 about here ] If players are sel…sh, the predicted outcome is easily determined by backwards induction. A sel…sh manager will not pay the bonus in the M -mode (given f M b M > 0). Anticipating this, a sel…sh worker will shirk under this organizational design. In the inspection mode a sel…sh worker will shirk if not monitored by the manager, therefore the manager will monitor him. 32 The outcome is that the worker does work under this mode, at the expense of the overall costs of the monitoring technology (k + h + d).
Given assumption (A1), under sel…sh preferences the I-mode is more e¢ cient than the M -mode is. Hence if the payo¤ parameters are such that the owner shares in these e¢ ciency gains, she would choose the I-mode over the M -mode. 33 It would be more e¢ cient, however, if the worker could be motivated to work in the M -mode, as this would save the overall costs of the monitoring technology.
Of course, in a fully ‡edged model the compensation parameters w M ; w I ; b M ; f M and f I would be endogenous. Here we just make the following simplifying assumptions. First, mainly for practical reasons we focus on the case in which f M = f I = 1 2 . 34 The share fraction is thus the same for the two organizational modes, such that the owner does not simply prefer one mode over the other because she can pay the manager less. Second, with respect to the wage and bonus payments w M ; w I and b M we assume that:
The wage level w M (= v 0 =3) ensures that all …rm members earn the same when the worker chooses to shirk in the M -mode. Similarly so, w I is set such that all …rm members get the same when the manager monitors in the I-mode. Finally, b M makes that all members earn the same when the manager pays the bonus in the M -mode after the worker decided to work. E¤ectively, payo¤ di¤erences are minimized in the three most relevant outcomes and potential e¢ ciency gains are shared equally. Under these assumptions, the resulting payo¤s in the two modes follow directly from the (exogenous) production technology parameters appearing in inequality (A1). The payo¤s appearing in Figure 1 
